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Abstract 
Fiscal responsibility laws are institutions with which multiple governments in the same economy—national and 
subnational—can commit to avoid irresponsible fiscal behavior that could have short-term advantages to one of them 
but that would be collectively damaging. Coordination failures with subnational governments in the 1980s and 90s 
contributed to macroeconomic instability and led several countries to adopt fiscal responsibility laws as part of the 
remedy. The paper analyzes the characteristics and effects of fiscal responsibility laws in seven countries—Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, and Peru. Fiscal responsibility laws are designed to address the short time 
horizons of policymakers, free riders among government units, and principal-agent problems between the national and 
subnational governments. The paper describes how the laws differ in the specificity of quantitative targets, the strength 
of sanctions, the methods for increasing transparency, and the level of government passing the law.  
Evidence shows that fiscal responsibility laws can help coordinate and sustain commitments to fiscal prudence, but they 
are not a substitute for commitment and should not be viewed as ends in themselves. They can make a positive 
contribution by adding to the collection of other measures to shore up a coalition of states with the central government 
in support of fiscal prudence. The commitment of the central government to its own fiscal prudence was critical for 
success of fiscal responsibility laws for subnational governments. 
Keywords: fiscal responsibility law, intergovernmental fiscal coordination, subnational debt 
1. Introduction 
As subnational governments (SNGs) in developing and developed countries have gained more fiscal 
autonomy-spending responsibilities, tax bases, revenue transfers from the center, and the capacity to incur debt—their 
fiscal behavior has become vital to the national interest. Subnational borrowing to finance social and economic 
infrastructure can generate positive net returns and spread the financing burden fairly across generations. When SNGs 
follow unsustainable fiscal policy, however, it can jeopardize the services they manage (but for which the central 
government may have ultimate political responsibility), the safety of the financial system, the country’s international 
creditworthiness, and overall macroeconomic stability. Too often the central government then gets dragged in to provide 
bailouts, which can disrupt its own fiscal sustainability and reward the populist fiscal tactics of the recipient SNGs. The 
global financial crisis of 2008-2010 has tested the effectiveness of fiscal rules in maintaining fiscal discipline and has 
shown some downsides of rigidity in the face of macroeconomic shocks.  
Since the 1990s many governments have looked for mechanisms to escape from fiscal populism that had been used as a 
strategy for winning elections and retaining public office. National governments have tried various ways to avert these 
problems. One way has been to pass a fiscal responsibility law (FRL) that prescribes proper fiscal behavior for SNGs, 
provides guidelines for parameters of SNG fiscal legislation, or sets incentives – rewards for success or sanctions for 
failure in following the rules. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, and Peru have done so. Some SNGs, as in Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, and India have imposed legal constraints on their own fiscal behavior, to reduce the temptation of 
state administrations to leave fiscal messes and to improve their creditworthiness in the markets. Although having not 
formally adopted subnational fiscal responsibility legislation, other countries such as Mexico, Poland, and Turkey have 
established fiscal rules or debt limitations for SNGs.  
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The paper focuses on laws that are called fiscal responsibility laws or that perform the same function. They have 
frameworks for making the budget process transparent and may include quantitative fiscal targets and enforcement 
mechanisms. They aim to restrain SNG deficits by preventing them in advance and/or by imposing extra penalties that 
go into effect more quickly and in addition to the inherent consequences of fiscal imprudence. These include both 
institutions imposed by the national government on the SNGs and institutions imposed by the SNGs on themselves. 
FRLs often have the additional effect of restraining the federal or central government from running unsustainable 
deficits and of mitigating the consequences of subnational fiscal excesses. The paper does not focus on other public 
finance laws, such as budget laws and debt laws, which contain elements of FRLs, although it does consider such laws 
when discussing the broader context of fiscal prudence.  
This paper analyzes the circumstances and character of FRLs that may contribute to better SNG fiscal behavior. As 
FRLs do not operate in isolation, the paper also considers the broader context of other laws and rules aimed at obtaining 
prudent fiscal behavior by SNGs. The paper includes Brazil, Colombia and Peru, where a unifying FRL applies to all 
levels of the government including the SNGs. In some other countries such as Argentina, Australia, and India, the FRL 
framework includes a national FRL, and SNGs may choose their own FRL framework. Provinces in Canada went ahead 
with their own FRLs within the overall national move toward fiscal consolidation. Although the paper mainly concerns 
FRLs that apply to SNGs, the paper will include the analysis of the national FRLs to the extent that they affect the 
parameters and incentives for SNGs. See Corbacho and Schwartz (2007) for a review of national level FRLs. 
The next section of the paper explains the historical origins of FRLs in the context of political and fiscal 
decentralization. Section 3 examines the purposes, incentives, and authority behind FRLs – which level of the 
government passes FRL and to which level of government the FRL applies. Section 4 summarizes the content of FRLs, 
covering procedural and transparency rules, and fiscal targets as well as sanctions and escape clause associated with the 
rules. Section 5 analyzes FRLs in broader institutional context for fiscal prudence and channels for strengthening 
subnational fiscal discipline. Section VI explores preliminary assessments of the effects of FRLs. Section 6 concludes 
and points to areas for further research.  
2. Historical Origins of FRLs 
Fiscal rules and legislation for SNGs are less important when a country has centralized political and fiscal institutions, 
as these centralized institutions can set rules and use political power to enforce discipline of SNGs. Decentralization, 
often associated with rise of regional power, has reduced the central administrative control over subnational fiscal 
behavior. Since the 1980s, a number of countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, and 
Russia, have decentralized varying degrees of fiscal authority and resources to their SNGs. Often, in the absence of 
adequate ex ante fiscal rules, this contributed to subnational fiscal or debt crises. In response, several of them passed 
fiscal responsibility laws.  
In each case, the features of the law, how it was passed, and its implementation reflected the particular political structure 
of the country and the nature of its fiscal crisis. This section summarizes those particularities, as prologue to the 
discussion of their FRLs—first the federal countries and then the unitary ones. The federal countries in our 
sample—Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and India—tend to be more fiscally decentralized; the key distinction, 
however, is that the constitutions of the federal countries give the states or provinces the right to make their own laws in 
many areas and restrict the range of areas for which the national government can legislate. Shifts in the allocation of 
taxing powers, for instance, have to be negotiated with the states; the national government cannot decide unilaterally. 
By contrast, in the unitary countries—here, Colombia and Peru—the constitution gives the national government power 
to legislate in all areas and to decide unilaterally what powers and fiscal resources it will delegate to the SNGs.  
Federalism in Brazil in the 1980s revived with the return to democracy from military rule. From 1982 to 1989 there was 
a sequence of electing governors, then electing mayors, electing a new congress with constitution-making authority, 
completing the new constitution, and finally holding the first direct election of the president. Thanks to the strong 
representation of SNGs in the 1986 congress, the 1988 constitution gave states significant authority and resources, 
including a much broader revenue base for the state-level VAT, but did not specify their spending responsibilities or set 
rules for fiscal prudence.  
From the beginning of Brazil’s political opening through mid-1990s, there were two major subnational debt crises. Each 
initial agreement that tried to resolve a crisis actually made the next crisis more likely, because they reinforced the 
perception that the federal government would provide debt relief, they provided such relief in the form of rescheduling 
(allowing the stock of debt to keep growing), set ceilings on debt service and thus on the effective political cost, bought 
out (without penalty) the foreign and private creditors to the SNGs and left the federal government holding the debt. 
Thus the state politicians suffered minimal consequences for their imprudence and their creditors suffered almost none, 
and so until 1997 the ex-ante constraints written in the rescheduling agreements were usually quickly evaded (Dillinger 
1997; Rodden 2003).  
Then in the late 1990s, this vicious cycle of failure in discipline and cooperation came to a halt, as the deeper political 
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and economic incentives had changed after a national macroeconomic adjustment program ended hyperinflation and 
stabilized the economy. In 1997-98 the federal government made debt restructuring agreements with 25 states, which 
was finally effective in making them, cease unsustainable borrowing. Three of the four largest debtor states supported 
the reforms and formed the core of a critical mass of states ready to cooperate in fiscal restraint, making it worthwhile 
for additional states join at the margin of cooperation. Also, the large scale of the states’ non-performing debt to the 
federal government strengthened the resolve of the federal Congress to enact the FRL. The federal government 
negotiated agreements with 25 states in 1997 and 1998.
1 
These agreements were sanctioned by Law 9496 of September 
1997 to reschedule the states’ debt conditioned on states undertaking fiscal reforms and compliance with fiscal targets.  
The FRL in 2000 codified fiscal adjustment programs sanctioned by various resolutions (Alfonso 2002; Dillinger 2002). 
At the time, many observers doubted whether the federal government would successfully enforce the debt restructuring 
agreement and sustain the stabilization, and this is why the extraordinary measure of the FRL may have been necessary, 
to reinforce the expectations of stability.  
Argentine provinces in the 1980s had no hard budget constraint, borrowed a lot, and effectively could monetize this 
debt, contributing to hyperinflation. The subsequent stabilization in 1991 centered on the Convertibility Plan, which 
fixed the Argentine exchange rate to the U.S. dollar. Through the 1990s the national government mainly followed a 
market-based strategy for coordinating fiscal discipline between levels of government: the central government would 
enforce hard budget constraints ex post and force the provinces to pay their debts (Dillinger and Webb 1999). By the 
end of the 1990s, the absence of the ex-ante fiscal controls had allowed a number of Argentine provinces to over-borrow, 
party fragmentation had narrowed the scope for fiscal compromises, and the national government had overcommitted 
itself by setting floors on transfers, even if national revenues fell (Gonzalez, Rosenblatt and Webb 2004).  
At the national level, faced with a deteriorating budget balance and growing debt payments, in 1999 the Congress 
approved a Fiscal Solvency Law—its first try at FRL. It aimed to and did inspire a third of the provinces to pass their 
own FRLs. In 2001, however, the FRLs stopped working because of the extreme mismatch between the national 
government’s fiscal and monetary policies and because the provincial FRLs lacked enforcement power and most of the 
economically important provinces had not passed them. Only 5 out of 11 provinces that imposed a hard budget 
constraint actually fulfilled their commitment (Braun and Tommasi 2004). In 2004, Argentina tried anew with a national 
FRL that applied to the provinces as well as the national government and capital federal district. It passed Congress 
hastily (Braun and Gadano 2007; Laudonia 2009), and it did not come out of a consensus building process with the 
provinces nor reflect a solid technical consideration of how the provinces might adjust their finances to meet the legal 
requirements. Although many provinces complied with some of the law’s procedural requirements, almost none were 
meeting the quantitative targets even before the onset of the global crisis in 2009. After that the quantitative targets were 
put on hold, which further undermined the credibility of the FRL process in Argentina. 
The Indian Constitution forbids states from borrowing abroad and requires them to obtain central permission for 
domestic borrowing. The central government places limits on states’ borrowing through the annual discussions with 
states on financing state development plans. While limiting explosive growth of state debt, the system has not prevented 
deterioration of fiscal trends as indicated by high levels of debt over Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) in many 
states in the late 1990s. Factors contributing to the deteriorating fiscal accounts across Indian states in the 1990s include: 
rapid increase in expenditures on salaries, retirement benefits, and pensions and subsidies, increased borrowing to 
support the growing revenue deficit, and growth in contingent liabilities associated with fiscal support to the public 
sector units, cooperatives, and the statutory boards. 
Since the early 2000s, the fiscal reform has focused on moving towards a more flexible, market-linked borrowing 
regime within sustainable overall borrowing caps imposed by the central government and self-imposed state-level 
deficit caps. The federal government enacted Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act in 2003 which applies 
to the national government only, but some states had also adopted their own FRLs before the enactment of the federal 
FRL (e.g., Karnataka and Punjab in 2002) and many states have since 2003 adopted FRLs in line with the national law. 
FRL has become mandatory after the Twelfth Finance Commission (2005) and the federal government has offered a 
sizeable incentive to states for passing FRL.  
The idea of legislating for fiscal responsibility gained considerable attention in the 1990s in Australia. At the federal 
level, the Business Council of Australia called for legislation requiring a surplus budget on average over the business 
cycle. It reiterated this theme during the 1996 federal election campaign. The adoption of the Charter of Budget Honesty 
Act in 1998 at the federal level followed years of improvement in fiscal outcomes. In fact, in the mid-1980s, Australia 
adopted its first set of explicit fiscal rules limiting the growth of expenditure, taxation and budget deficit. Although the 
recession in the 1990s saw the net debt of the country increased, never went beyond 20 percent of GDP. The combined 
                                                        
1
Only two states (Tocantins and Amapá) did not have any bonded debt, and hence did not participate in the refinancing agreements.  
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state and Commonwealth general government net debt had not exceeded 30 percent of GDP in the 1990s (Simes, 2003).  
Some states had adopted fiscal responsibility legislation prior to the federal government’s adoption. New South Wales 
passed legislation in 1995 to commit itself and future governments to medium- and long-term fiscal responsible targets 
including the elimination of the net debt. Victoria passed the Financial Management Act in 1994, which was amended in 
2000 through the Financial Management (Financial Responsibility) Act, which outlines principles of sound financial 
management, reporting standards and pre-election budget update. Minister must produce a pre-election budget update 
10 days after the issue of a writ for an election. The Act broadly states what the update must contain and the principles 
upon which it must be based.  
In Canada, in the 1990s both the federal and provincial governments needed serious fiscal corrections to reverse 
chronic fiscal deficits and growing debt burden after years of lax fiscal policy.2 The drive for restoring fiscal health 
was viewed as means to help accelerate economic growth. The deteriorating sovereign ratings3 increased the cost of 
borrowing, and private saving was not sufficient to finance both private investments and chronic fiscal deficits (Traclet 
2004). The federal government undertook legislative reforms during the 1999s: enacting the Federal Spending Control 
Act (1991) setting limits on spending, and adopting a new framework to meet the medium-term fiscal balance and 
decrease debt ratio with rolling short-term deficit targets. Such measures succeeded in significantly reducing the 
national debt (IMF, 2002).  
In this context, many provinces in the 1990s also adopted legislation to promote balanced-budgets and debt reduction 
(Millar 1997)
4, which may have helped increase the provincial finance ministers’ bargaining power to promote 
unpopular fiscal measures (Kennedy and Robbins, 2003). These legislation set specific fiscal targets such as annual 
balanced budget and target year for debt elimination (Alberta), prohibited budget deficits in any year (Manitoba), set 
deadlines for achieving a balanced operating account (New Brunswick), and required net expenditures to decline by a 
certain percentage over a four-year period (Nova Scotia). Three more provinces enacted similar acts in 2000-2004.
5
 For 
example, New Brunswick adopted Fiscal Responsibility and Balanced Budget Act in 2006 to cover the entire provincial 
budget, following the Balanced Budget Act in 1995. The province also enacted the Fiscal Stabilization Act in 2001 to 
stabilize the fiscal position from year to year and improve long-term fiscal planning and stability.  
Colombia has traditionally been centralist, to offset the natural geographic fragmentation and to try to contain the 
centrifugal forces of strong special interest groups. Overlying the natural geographic fragmentation, strong non-regional 
interests dominate the political dialogue—some operate within the legitimate political system, like teachers and 
producers of coffee, cattle and sugar, while others are outside and challenging it, namely two guerilla movements, the 
paramilitaries, and drug producers. Decentralization started in Colombia with the 1968 deconcentration of national 
revenues to subnational administrative units, with revenue sharing set by formula and mostly earmarked for specific 
sectors (Bird 1984). The 1991 constitution (which also made the office of governor an elected post) and Law 60 of 1993 
expanded the amount of revenues assigned to departments by broadening the base of the existing revenue-sharing 
system (the situado fiscal). The Constitution and Law 60 committed the national government each year to expand 
revenue sharing with SNGs until it would reach nearly half of all current revenues by 2002.  
In the late 1980s and 1990s the trend toward political decentralization was accompanied by more freedom for 
subnational domestic borrowing, and hence a rise in their debt. To increase the central government’s control over 
subnational debt, the so-called Traffic Light Law of 1997 introduced a rating system for territorial governments, based 
on the ratios of interest to operational savings and of debt to current revenues. Highly indebted local governments (red 
light) were prohibited from borrowing, and intermediate cases (yellow light) were required to obtain permission from 
the Ministry of Finance. The law often did not have the desired effect, however, as some governments with a red-light 
rating obtained new financing without permission of the Ministry of Finance, and departments often changed from 
yellow to red, rather than moving from yellow to green, as expected. In a new attempt to implement fiscal rules to 
stabilize subnational finances, Colombia passed Law 617 in 2000, which functioned in many ways as a Subnational 
FRL; despite the fiscal crisis at the national level in 2001-02, Law 617 had some success at the subnational level and 
laid the foundations for subsequent steps. In June 2003 the government passed the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which 
applied to the national as well as the subnational governments.  
Peru is a unitary state, with even more of a centralized tradition than Colombia. Decentralization came relatively late to 
Peru, as part of a democratic reaction after Fujimori’s exit in 2001. The 2002 decentralization law foresaw having half 
                                                        
2
The fiscal correction was concurrent with monetary policy of inflation targeting. The attainment of announced targets has improved market and 
public confidence in the central bank’s commitment to low and stable inflation (Traclet, 2004). 
3Rating agencies downgraded the sovereign debt: in foreign currency in 1994 and in local currency in 1995 by Moody’s and in foreign currency in 
1993. 
4Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Northwest Territories, the Yukon from 1993-1996.  
5British Colombia, Ontario, and Newfoundland.  
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or more of public sector spending managed and to some extent allocated by subnational governments—districts, and 
municipalities—compared to the previous situation where SNGs managed less than 10 percent of public spending. In 
contrast to the experiences of the other Latin American countries discussed here, the behavior of subnational public 
finances in Peru never deteriorated to the point where it adversely affected the country’s financial sector or 
macroeconomic stability. As they contemplated fiscal decentralization and saw the macroeconomic problems that 
decentralized countries had had in the 1990s, the authorities passed the FRL and other measures to assure that fiscal 
decentralization did not lead to fiscal imbalances. As discussed below, the restraint measures in Peru succeeded perhaps 
too well, preventing effective fiscal devolution. 
3. FRLs – Purpose, Incentives, and Authority 
Before delving into the content of FRLs (section IV), we need to understand why governments might pass such laws, 
how they fit in the political context, how they address the timing of borrowing-lending decisions, which level of 
government passes them, and to which governments the FRL applies. 
3.1 Aligning fiscal incentives  
In a normative theory of good government, voters want to avoid the effects of a fiscal crisis—inflationary finance, 
sudden increase of taxes, disruption of service, and increased borrowing costs—so their government would equally 
want to avoid the crises. In practice, governments may fail to follow sustainable fiscal policies for a variety of reasons 
discussed in this section (see Alesina 1994 for a survey and Saeigh and Tommasi 2000 for applications to federations). 
Multiple levels of government multiply the possible reasons for failure of fiscal responsibility. To deal with these 
problems, governments have adopted various institutions to try to restrain themselves, including balanced-budget rules, 
autonomous central banks, and congressional oversight committees. Since the late 1990s, governments have added 
FRLs to the potential and actual toolkit.  
Governments are interested in FRLs to deal with four problems: i) short time horizons of policymakers; ii) free riders 
among SGNs; iii) principal agent and moral hazards problems between the national and SN governments; and iv) 
demonstrating commitments to be creditworthy. The first and fourth problems apply to governments at any level, 
whereas the second and third are relevant mainly in countries with multilevel government. 
Short time-horizons of policymakers. A government may wish to institutionalize its commitment to control its impulses 
to run excessive deficits, in order to resist temptation in more pressing times that may come in the future. Policymakers 
often have shorter time-horizons than citizens, because they have shorter terms of office than citizens’ life spans and 
policymakers face the risk of being voted out of office if results are painful in the short-term. Also the mobility of 
citizens and businesses between local jurisdictions means that excess borrowing could drive residents away and leave 
those remaining with more debt per person than they had anticipated. So legislators can gain voter support by passing a 
law (e.g., FRL) that provides extra motivation for longer term fiscal sustainability.  
Free riders. A group of governments in the same country may wish to make and enforce a mutual agreement that each 
of them would avoid running excessive deficits. To see the free-rider problem in this context, suppose that multiple 
governments share the same currency, central bank, domestic credit market, and (at least to some extent) international 
credit reputation. Then they will share a common interest in sustainable fiscal balances for the country in the aggregate, 
to maintain stable prices, a healthy financial system, and good access to international credit. Individual governments’ 
interests would diverge from the common interest, however, in that factors such as electoral pressures would motivate 
them to follow fiscal behavior that is risky or unsustainable. An individual government would bear only part of the cost 
of its misbehavior, but would still receive all of whatever perceived benefit accrued. They could benefit from this, 
however, only if (most of) the other governments continued to follow good fiscal behavior. So, there might be prisoners’ 
dilemma—a situation where the equilibrium of isolated individual choices leads to suboptimal outcomes for all.6 All 
the governments would, therefore, benefit from having a system of rules—an FRL—to discourage such defection and 
free-riding.  
In a country with multiple governments, the national government already exists for the purpose (among others) of 
protecting the common interests, has much greater fiscal weight than the others, and typically has special powers, like 
running the central bank and regulating the financial sector. The national government also provides transfers to the 
SNGs, which often are the main source of subnational revenue and give the national government additional leverage 
over them. But this may not be enough. Rules of revenue sharing and other rules of the system (like the constitution) 
                                                        
6
Inman (2003) develops the prisoners’ dilemma model formally for this situation and shows how restrictive are the conditions under which the market 
successfully establishes SN fiscal discipline if the central government takes a hands-off no-bailout approach. The conditions include competitive 
suppliers of local public services, a stable central government, clear and enforceable accounting standards, a well-managed aggregate economy, and 
an informed and sophisticated local government bond market.  
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may restrain the national government’s power over the SNGs. Political considerations may bias the decisions of the 
national government away from the optimal; these could be the national political cycle or subnational ones (Braun and 
Tommasi 2004). For instance when a state government of the same political party as the national government faces a 
close election, the national government might be inclined to condone the state’s fiscal misbehavior by offering a debt 
bailout or rescheduling guarantee. Also, under some configurations of political institutions, the national executive might 
need to purchase blocks of legislative votes through provincial fiscal favors, in ways that also break the inter-temporal 
Wicksellian connection, by which voters demand fiscal discipline to protect their interest as taxpayers. Thus, the 
agreement to protect the common interest would not only need to restrain the fiscal behavior of the individual SNGs but 
also restrain the behavior of the federal government. 
Principal-agent and moral hazard problems. When citizens or a higher level of government (the principal) entrusts a 
subnational government (agent) with resources and the responsibility to carry out a task, then there is the 
principal-agent problem in assuring that the agent government will maintain the requisite fiscal stability to carry out the 
task, without default or bailout. Sub-national borrowers as agents have an incentive not to repay their lenders as 
principals because they perceive that they will be bailed-out by the central government in case of default, resulting in 
moral hazard. This hazard may increase when the central government is also the creditor, since rollover of the debt is 
often the easy way out when an SNG does not pay what it owes to the central government. The incidence of these 
agency problems varies considerably depending on the structure of the subnational debt market in each country. For 
instance, the credibility and prudence of a no-bailout commitment by the national government in the event of 
subnational default depends partly on whether the creditors to the defaulting SNG are foreign or domestic.  
Demonstrating commitment to be creditworthy. Borrowers, including SNGs, have an incentive not to reveal negative 
characteristics about themselves to lenders, which results in adverse selection— lenders will therefore charge a risk 
premium above what is directly justified by the revealed information, even for a borrower who is not risky. So the 
asymmetrical information can lead to mispricing of risks. To improve its terms of borrowing, a government needs to 
show creditors that it is not like those other government units of lesser credit or that it has given up the fiscally 
irresponsible ways of its past. It can demonstrate this commitment by constraining itself with a FRL, its own or from the 
national level. Once one government demonstrates its commitment by passing an FRL, the pressure increases on other 
governments in the country to follow suit, in order not to stand out as the government that is not committed to fiscal 
responsibility. If the entire country has an FRL framework, then it will be the adherence to the fiscal targets that will 
become more important.  
Fiscal responsibility laws have some downsides as well. Most importantly they tend to make aggregate fiscal policy 
more pro-cyclical. Although most FRLs have some escape clause for the eventuality of a recession and some call for 
stabilization funds, it has been difficult to set these up in a way that are adequately countercyclical, while still 
demanding rigorous fiscal responsibility (Melamud 2010).  
3.2 Incentives in the political system for fiscal prudence  
The political characteristics of the countries affect both the need for subnational fiscal-control institutions and their 
effectiveness. Indeed, to some extent the political factors that increase the need for an FRL also make it more difficult to 
pass one and to enforce it successfully. Several dimensions of political system are relevant: i) a majority party of the 
executive in legislature versus coalition (parliamentary) or divided government (presidential); ii) strong party identities 
and unity, including closed-list nominations for legislature, versus weak parties and open lists; iii) autonomy of SNGs 
constitutionally versus national government power to intervene and otherwise control; and iv) a strong role for the 
national legislature and strong influence of governors over legislators, versus strong national executive authority 
(Dillinger and Webb 1999). To the extent that the constitution and party system lead to more centralized power, the 
country will have less need for special institutions to coordinate fiscal discipline across governments over time and 
between states. In some countries in our sample, however, the fiscal decentralization was part of a more general 
decentralization of power, which was linked with the restoration or establishment of democratic rule (Garman et al 
2001). The party with centralist tendencies and strong public sector dominance may be more interested in pushing a 
certain development path through state control, central planning and a strong public sector than fiscal management. 
Subsequent decentralization and market decontrol have led to increasing need for central coordination of policies. 
The national and SNGs are not always autonomous agents, as the previous section presumed. For instance they can be 
manifestations of the same political party. Such arrangements can reduce the free-rider and principal-agent problems 
described above, because the party aligns the incentives of the national and subnational politicians. The Argentine 
Justicialista (Peronist) Party in the mid-1990s and the Indian Congress Party in its years of dominance performed 
similar functions of harmonizing the incentives of policymakers at national and subnational levels. When the 
single-party dominance in these countries ended or diminished substantially, with the increase of democracy, the 
absence of the extra-constitutional (but legal) channels for inter-governmental coordination created the need for FRLs 
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or other formal mechanisms for coordination.  
Even without a strong party system, a powerful president can enforce subnational fiscal discipline.7 President Cardoso 
in Brazil became a strong president in the late 1990s even in a context of weak party loyalties and used his office (and 
reputation as an inflation fighter, from when he was Minister of Finance) to press successfully for fiscal discipline at the 
national and subnational levels. The institutionalization of this discipline included the FRL but had already started with 
some previous measures. President Uribe in Colombia also used his political popularity, without a strong party base, to 
pass the FRL in 2003. This was in the context since the late 1990s of much weaker loyalties to the two traditionally 
strong parties, which had fought over many things but had agreed on maintaining macroeconomic stability. 
These examples show the importance of the particular political situation in each country—with effects both on whether 
the country needs an FRL and whether it can gather the consensus to pass one. An FRL seems most likely when there is 
an intermediate degree of political cohesion—with a high degree of cohesion an FRL may not be needed, and with a 
low degree one cannot pass or enforce the FRL. 
3.3 Authority: Which government passes the FRL? To which government does it apply? 
The FRLs differ in terms of which government passes it and to which government(s) it applies but the content of the 
two types is similar. Some FRLs are national laws that apply to all levels of government, or at least to the national and 
intermediate (state, provincial) levels, as in Argentina (2004), Brazil (2000), Colombia (2003), and Peru (2003). From 
the SNG point of view, these are top-down systems.8 In other cases, such as Argentina (1999), Australia, and India, the 
federal government passes an FRL only for itself, and this sets the framework, incentive, or example for the SNGs to 
pass their own FRLs voluntarily. In some cases, a SNG would enact its own FRL (e.g., the Indian states of Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu and some Australian states) before the enactment of the federal FRL. A few Canadian provinces have 
passed their own FRLs to sustain fiscal discipline and to improve their credit ratings.9 
Table 1 summarizes how various countries have handled the issues of which government passes the law and which it 
applies to. With either type of law, enforcement is an issue. There is difference, however, between a government trying 
to discipline itself with a law that it has the power to change and a higher-level government disciplines a lower-level 
government that has some political independence. In the latter type of arrangement, it remains uncertain whether the 
national government will have the tools and political determination to enforce the law. When the national government 
passes an FRL law that does not directly prescribe what the SNGs must do, a key question is whether the SNGs follow 
the federal example and pass and obey their own laws. Given the complex variety of intergovernmental systems, there is 
no single optimal recipe for which level of the government can or should pass the FRL and to which level of 
government it should apply.  
In the US and Canada the political tradition of state and provincial autonomy and independence, along with consistent 
no-bail policy by the center, has existed from the 19th century and has generally instilled subnational fiscal discipline 
through ex post consequences. The explicit institutional responses have been at the state and provincial level, with their 
own laws or constitutional amendments to set ex ante constraints to keep the subnational governments out of trouble 
(Inman 2003; Wallis, Sylla, and Grinath 2004). Neither federal government has an FRL pertaining to the SNGs. No US 
state has an FRL, although most have more or less strict limits on state borrowing and deficits, with origins back to the 
19th century. The federal government does not have enough sway to force an FRL upon them.  
Table 1. Which Government Passed FRL and To Which Levels Does It Apply? 
I.  National FRL applies to all 
levels, usually more strictly 
to SNGs 
National 
FRL applies only to 
national level 
SNGs with own FRLs 
Federal constitution    
Brazil X   
India  X X 
Argentina X 2004 X 1999 X (some in 1999) 
Canada   X 
Australia  X X 
    
Unitary constitution    
Colombia X   
Peru X   
                                                        
7
 Although a strong president usually creates a party of his followers, if the main unifying factor is the personality of the president, one cannot 
accurately call this a strong party system.  
8 Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997) argue that such top-down control is necessary for SN fiscal discipline in developing countries. Rodden and 
Eskeland (2003), with more evidence to consider, see prospects for combining hierarchical control with market discipline, and gradually letting the 
latter take more weight. 
9 West Bengal and Sikkim are the only two states out of 28 that have not enacted an FRL. 
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Brazil’s FRL was passed by the national government for all levels of government; it uses both ex ante rules and legal 
penalties to contribute to the consolidation of a critical mass of consensus for fiscal prudence among powerful 
governors who had few party loyalties but strong influence over national legislators. Colombia, a unitary country of 
―autonomous‖ departments, already had various laws constraining subnational borrowing, and to get more institutional 
backing for fiscal balance at the national level they passed an explicit FRL in 2003. It adds to the ex ante constraints on 
SNGs and sets up transparency and accountability procedures for encouraging fiscal prudence at the national level.  
Peru has had a national-level FRL since 2000, and then in 2002-2003 municipal and regional governments got elections 
and obtained substantial de jure fiscal autonomy, including the right to borrow. Therefore, the government revised the 
FRL in 2003, with provisions for the SNGs as well as tighter constraints on national fiscal behavior. Argentina has gone 
through several FRL arrangements without success. The 1999 national government’s FRL was only directly for the 
national government and called for provinces to pass their own FRLs, which some did but some others did not, 
including the largest province. In the fiscal crisis of 2000-01 and beyond, both the federal and SNGs missed the FRL 
targets and the laws seemed irrelevant. In 2004, the national government passed an FRL that applied to all levels. The 
federal government and SNGs were missing the targets even before the 2008-2009 world financial crisis, however, and 
in 2009 the essential provisions of the law were suspended.  
4. Content of FRLs 
This section analyzes the content of FRLs relating to SNGs in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, 
and Peru. The analysis is organized along three dimensions: procedural rules for transparency and accountability, fiscal 
targets – quantitative or qualitative, and enforcement and escape clauses. For Brazil, Colombia and Peru, the analysis 
focuses on the unified FRL that applies to the SNGs. In Argentina, Australia, Canada, and India, the subnational 
governments have passed their own FRLs, in addition to the national law in Argentina and India. (See Liu and Webb 
2011 for details.) 
In general, there is greater convergence among countries on the procedural rules and fiscal targets, and more variability 
on the escape clause and enforcement. All FRLs call for the processes of budget formulation and execution that increase 
transparency and rationality. Many FRLs require medium-term fiscal frameworks. Almost all FRLs have explicit fiscal 
targets – fiscal deficit, debt, or both, or other variables such as operating budget balance. In some FRLs, additional 
variables are targeted, such as expenditure growth and composition.  
4.1 Procedural rules for transparency and accountability 
All FRLs in the countries discussed call for processes that increase the transparency and rationality of formulating and 
executing the budget. Typically the FRL requires annual publication and legislative discussion of a fiscal plan and budget, 
and often this is for multiple years on a rolling basis. The presentation may have to include full costing of any new 
spending programs or tax changes. Fiscal transparency includes having an audit of subnational financial accounts, making 
periodic public disclosures of key fiscal data, or exposing hidden liabilities. The FRLs also vary in the extent to which 
they control arrears and the deficits of off-budget entities, like companies owned wholly or largely by SNGs.   
The requirements for a medium-term fiscal framework and a transparent budgetary process aim to ensure that fiscal 
accounts move within a sustainable debt path and that fiscal adjustment takes a medium-term approach to better respond 
to shocks and differing trajectories for key macroeconomic variables that affect subnational finance. The transparent 
budgetary process affords debates by executive and legislative branches on spending priorities, funding sources, and 
required fiscal adjustments.  
To a large degree the effectiveness of these requirements depends on how diligently the legislature and the press monitor 
these publications and compliance with them. The discipline and sanctions from the political pressures and the access to 
information about commitments and subsequent compliance can help enforce FRLs. Credit markets can also help with 
discipline by imposing risk premiums and raising the cost of borrowing if there is fiscal misbehavior. The countries with 
FRLs under discussion are all democracies, but they vary in how well their institutions function to achieve accountability. 
Brazil’s FRL sets minimum standards for state budgeting, personnel management, and debt management. The annual 
budget prepared by each SNG has to be consistent with its multiyear budget plan and with the federal fiscal and monetary 
program. The FRL systematizes and reinforces the restrictions on personnel spending, deficits and debt that were in the 
state debt rescheduling agreements and other earlier measures (Law 9496 and the Senate resolutions). The accrual 
accounting method for all levels of the government eliminates an important source of hidden liabilities: arrears. It also 
contains specific limits on spending commitments by governments in their final year in office.  
In Brazil, moreover, article 48 of Brazil’s Fiscal Responsibility Law (2000) enshrines fiscal transparency as a key 
component of the new framework. Proposals, laws, and accounts are to be widely distributed, including through the use of 
electronic media (all reports are on the government website). Article 54 requires that all levels of governments publish a 
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quarterly fiscal management report that contains the major fiscal variables and indicates compliance with fiscal targets. 
Pursuant to article 57, this report is to be certified by the audit courts. 
In Colombia, the FRL specifies the process for setting budget targets and linking them to target ranges for debts and 
deficits. Regulations for the law institutionalized the practice at the national level and in some SNGs of publishing 
quarterly fiscal results, defining deficits on the basis of cash revenue and accrual of spending obligations, and defining 
debt to include floating debt. The FRL set a target to eliminate reservas presupuestales (pre-committed expenditures) in 
two years, which was done. The other part of floating debt, accounts payable, were counted as regular debt and thus 
controlled by the fiscal/financial plan. To help with fiscal discipline at all levels, the FRL prohibits the national 
government from lending to an SNG or guaranteeing its debt if it is in violation of Law 617 of 2000 or Law 357 of 1997, 
or if it is in arrears on any debt service to the national government. Indeed, a subnational government with those fiscal 
violations may not legally borrow from anyone. To discourage electoral cycles in fiscal policy, the FRL prohibits any 
government from committing spending in future years or increasing personnel spending in an election year. Departmental 
and municipal central administrations are not allowed to make transfers to their public entities. Strict limits apply to 
creation of new municipalities, and municipalities proven non-viable have to merge. 
In Peru the 2003 FRL built upon the 2000 FRL (Fiscal Prudence Law), extending it to SNGs. It required that the annual 
fiscal deficit of the non-financial public sector not exceed the limit in the multi-annual fiscal framework and in any case 
would not exceed specific targets (discussed below). Each regional government must prepare and publish an annual 
development plan that is consistent with the national fiscal framework (including the size of total public sector deficit). 
Quarterly monitoring of the fiscal performance is required and, in case of revenue shortfall, adequate remedies to 
revenues and/or expenditures must start in the next quarter. Although the subnational fiscal frameworks have to fit within 
the national one—whereas in some other countries the SNGs fiscal frameworks merely have to be internally consistent 
and are not directly subordinated to the national government’s fiscal framework—this has not usually been a binding 
constraint in Peru, as the national government and the overall general government have not hit the limit and ran surpluses 
in 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
Argentina’s Fiscal Solvency Law in September 1999 called for limits in the growth of expenditures, the adoption of 
multi-year budgeting, creation of a Countercyclical Fiscal Fund, and various transparency measures regarding public 
finances-the features favored by the recent literature on fiscal rules. The new FRL in 2004 applies to the provincial as well 
as national levels and has similar procedural requirements—rolling 3-year budget plan with projection of revenue and 
spending by destination, functional and economic categories. An intergovernmental commission coordinates the 
definitions of budget categories and evaluates budget proposals. The multiannual fiscal plans and results need to be 
published on the governments’ web pages (Melamud 2010). The law does not spell out coordination on some key items, 
like the national government’s specification of salary increases for teachers, which provinces have to pay and which set 
the standard of pay demands by the rest of provincial workers. These unfunded mandates effectively derailed provincial 
spending plans, leaving provincial governments largely unable to control their fiscal situations. Discretionary transfers 
from the national government have allowed them to meet their payment obligations and kept made them more politically 
dependent. 
In India, FRLs passed by states typically require the state government present its medium-term fiscal plan with annual 
budget to the state legislature. The fiscal plan should set forth multi-year rolling targets for key fiscal indicators. Some 
FRLs require that the state at the time of budget presentation disclose contingent liabilities created by guarantees provided 
to public sector undertakings, and some FRLs require the disclosure of borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India and 
liabilities on the state government for any separate legal entities. Most FRLs require disclosure of significant changes in 
the accounting policies.  
In Australia, the procedural rules and transparency are expressed in varied terms across FRLs of states; this is in contrast 
to India where FRLs enacted by states have strikingly similar content. But the over-archiving content of the FRLs across 
states in Australia centers on sound fiscal management, transparency in disclosing fiscal policy and accounts, and tabling 
of fiscal budgets to state legislature for oversight. For example, the Fiscal Responsibility Act (2005) of New South Wales 
lays out the fiscal principles and targets for the state. In application of fiscal principles, the government should report in 
annual budget papers: an assessment of past and prospective long-term average revenue growth; an assessment of the 
impact of budget measures in respect of expenses and revenue on long-term fiscal gaps; measures taken to reflect the 
fiscal principles; and the estimated impact of proposed tax policy changes. These principles are supported by the Public 
Finance and Audit Act 1983 that requires the treasurer to: release publicly monthly statement and half year review setting 
out projections and year-to-date balances for the budget; table the annual budget in the Legislative Assembly; and present 
audited financial statements to the Legislative Assembly.  
FRLs of provincial governments in Canada place responsibility and accountability with the provincial finance minister. 
The finance minister must present a budget plan and annual report to the legislature of the provincial government and 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 3, No. 1; 2016 
127 
 
make these available to the public, within prescribed deadlines. Variations exist about the exact nature of disclosure, for 
example, the public disclosure in Ontario includes mid-year review of fiscal plan, updated information about revenues and 
expenses, long-range assessment of fiscal environment two years after provincial election, and pre-election reports under 
certain regulation. In New Brunswick, each year the minister shall provide details as to how the public may participate in 
pre-budget consultations and shall make public a pre-budget consultation document that sets out the key fiscal issues for 
consideration.  
4.2 Fiscal targets  
In addition to procedural rules and transparency, most FRLs reviewed here spell out fiscal targets for SNGs with the 
most common target being the deficit, and there are differences in the degree of specificity about other targets such as 
debt stock, spending and guarantees.  
Table 2 below summarizes fiscal targets in the FRLs for SNGs in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, and Peru. As can 
be seen, fiscal targets are uniform for SNGs in Brazil, Colombia and Peru; this is not surprising as these countries each 
has a unified FRL applied to all levels of government.  
Table 1. Fiscal Responsibility Laws – Fiscal Targets for SNGs 
II.  Fiscal Targets 
Federal Constitution  
Argentina (2004)  Primary spending growth at or below the growth rate of national GDP. 
 Budget balances of provinces sufficient to bring debt service below 15% 
of current revenue, net of municipal transfers. 
Brazil   Personnel spending 60 percent or less of net fiscal revenue for states and 
municipalities, with ceilings for each branch of government 
 Compliance with targets in mandatory limits set by the Senate 
India (states)  Annual reduction of revenue deficit  
 Elimination of revenue deficit by certain date 
 Annual reduction of fiscal deficit  
 Fiscal deficit/GSDP <= 3 percent of GSDP 
 Limits on guarantees 
 Total liabilities <= 25-28 percent of GSDP 
Unitary Constitution  
Colombia  Interest payment/operational savings 
 Debt/current revenue 
Peru  Fiscal deficit of total non-financial public sector including SNGs no 
more than 1 percent of GDP.  
 Real growth of public sector spending including SNGs no more than 3 
percent per year 
 Stock of debt for each SNG may not exceed 100 percent of the current 
revenue, and the debt service (interest and amortization) may not exceed 
25 percent of the current revenue 
 The average primary balance of each SNG for the last 3 years may not be 
negative 
Note: Revenue deficit in India is the difference between total revenue and current expenditure.  
Sources: see Liu and Webb 2011, Annex 1. 
Table 2 shows that fiscal targets differ across countries, and across SNGs in some countries. In the absence of market 
discipline, letting national governments or SNGs to do this for themselves—passing a law stating what budget they 
have to pass—has the inherent weakness that the same legislative body that would pass an unbalanced budget (in 
violation of the law) could also vote to change the law. If the national FRL specifies fiscal ratios for the SNGs, however, 
this has more inherent strength, since it provides a legal basis for the higher level of government (and typically a source 
for fiscal transfers) to impose limits on the SNGs. These limits are typically stated in terms of the ratio of deficits, 
borrowing, debt stock, and debt service to fiscal revenue or gross domestic product. Revenue is likely to be a more 
effective basis, since it is known sooner and with more precision than gross domestic product.  
Since FRLs aim to prevent the fiscal slippage from deterioration to insolvency, focusing on ratios where the subnational 
government has more control over the denominator as well as the numerator (e.g., wage bill as a share of total spending) 
is more likely to have the desired effect than relying only on ratios, like debt service or debt stock to gross product. 
These ratios are substantially influenced by exogenous factors (interest and exchange rates) and often go over the limit 
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only after problems have gotten out of hand. 
In Brazil, the debt restructuring agreements between the federal government and the states in 1997 established a 
comprehensive list of fiscal targets—debt-to-revenue ratio, primary balance, personnel spending as share of total 
spending, own-source revenue growth, and investment ceilings—as well as a list of state-owned enterprises or banks to 
be privatized or concessioned. The annual budget of each SNG has to be consistent with its multiyear budget plan and 
with the federal fiscal and monetary program. The FRL mandates Senate resolutions to set the specific targets for SNG 
debt and fiscal balances. The FRL systematizes and reinforces the restrictions on fiscal variables such as personnel 
spending as a share of SNG net revenue and on borrowing. It also contains specific provisions for authorities in their 
final year in office. These restrictions on the borrowers’ side were complemented by restrictions on the supply of credit 
from banks and international lenders. 
In Colombia, the Fiscal Transparency and Responsibility Law (2003) in combination with a modified version of the 
Traffic-Light Law (Law 358 of 1997) rates SNGs according to the ratios of debt to payment capacity, and SNGs rated in 
the red-light zone are prohibited from borrowing, and those in the green-light zone are permitted to borrow up to limits 
based on debt sustainability calculations. Departments and large municipalities must get satisfactory credit ratings from 
international rating agencies before they borrow (following the idea from a regulation in Mexico since 2000).  
In Peru, the FRL limits the deficit of the total public sector 1 percent of GDP (or the amount in the national fiscal 
framework, whichever is less), except in congressionally authorized cases of national emergency or international crisis, 
when the deficit could go to 2.5 percent.10 In addition, each SNG has to keep a non-negative primary balance on 
average for the last 3 years, and they may not have debt service over 25 percent of current revenue or debt stock over 
100 percent. In election years, the governments may not spend more than 60 percent of the annual spending allocation 
in the first 7 months and may not use more than 40 percent of the annual limit on the deficit in the first half of fiscal 
year. 11 The FRL sets some ex ante procedural constraints for subnational borrowing, and SNGs can only borrow 
internationally with the guarantee of the national government. The guarantee for any loan requires compliance with the 
Annual Debt Law and demonstration of the capacity to pay, which provisions give the national government the 
authority to veto SNG borrowing.
12 
 
Fiscal targets adopted by Indian states are remarkably similar to each other with respect to fiscal and revenue deficits. 
Some states FRLs also place limits on guarantees. Basically, in the early 2000s, some states went ahead of the federal 
government in enacting Fiscal Responsibility and Financial Management Act (e.g. Karnataka in 2002). The federal act 
in 2003 has similar fiscal targets as those in these early reforming states. Subsequently, the 12th Finance Commission 
mandated fiscal responsibility legislation for all states, with revenue deficit (total revenue minus current expenditures) 
to be eliminated and the fiscal deficit to be reduced to 3 percent of GSDP by fiscal year 2009. Some states issued 
additional legislation on fiscal targets, for example the Kerala Ceiling on Government Guarantee Act (2003) that was 
enacted the same year as its FRL. According to the guarantee act, the guarantee outstanding for any fiscal year shall not 
exceed rupees fourteen thousand crores (about US$3 billion); no government guarantee shall be given to private entity; 
and the state shall established a Guarantee Redemption Fund. 
In contrast to India, where fiscal targets with respect to revenue and fiscal deficits are similar across states, states in 
Australia do not have similar fiscal targets. The fiscal targets in New South Wales differ from those in Queensland. The 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2005 in New South Wales sets forth the following targets: Reduce general government net 
financial liabilities to <= 7.5 percent of GSDP by June 30, 2010; and to <= 6 percent by June 30, 2015; maintain general 
government net debt <= 0.8 percent of GSDP, and eliminate total state sector unfunded superannuation liabilities by 
June 30, 2020. The Charter of Fiscal Responsibility of 2009 in Queensland sets forth a quite different set of fiscal 
targets: the General Government sector meets all operating expenses from operating revenue; growth in own-purpose 
expenses in the General Government sector to not exceed real per capital growth; achieve a General Government net 
operating surplus no later than 2015-2016; stabilize net financial liabilities as a proportion of revenue in the 
Non-financial Public Sector; and target full funding of long-term liabilities such as superannuation in accordance with 
actuarial advice.  
FRLs in the Australian states of Western Australia and Northern Territory have only one fiscal target stipulating that 
                                                        
10
The 2000 (pre-decentralization) version of the FRL had such a restriction on general government fiscal balances, implicitly including SNGs; the 
2003 FRL made the application to SNGs explicit. 
11Subsequent legislation has made minor modifications to these limits, but not undermined their intent. For instance, in 2007 and 2008 (Law Nos. 
29035 and 29144) the restriction on the growth of the non-financial expenditure was changed to ―annual real growth of the consumption expenditure 
of the central government‖, which may not exceed 4%, using the inflationary target from the central bank. 
12SNGs are not prohibited from getting domestic credit without the guarantee, but this must come within the overall public sector deficit constraint. 
Thus, the national government could use the requirements for getting credit with the guarantee and other means to force SNGs to report their non- 
guaranteed borrowing and to keep it within the total deficit constraint. With multiple channels of control at their disposal, the national Ministry of 
Economics and Finance has keep SNG borrowing under tight control. 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 3, No. 1; 2016 
129 
 
funding for current services to be provided by the current revenue generation. The states of Victoria and Tasmania do 
not have fiscal targets, but their FRLs have established financial management principles including: prudent management 
of financial risks; spending and taxing policies to be formulated to maintain a reasonable degree of stability and 
predictability; and ensuring that policy decisions have regard to their financial effects on future generations. These 
principles are also established by the states of Western Australia and Northern Territory.  
Fiscal targets vary across Canadian provinces, (Liu and Webb 2011, Annex 2). Most provinces require a balanced 
budget. British Colombia requires only the balance budget rule while Quebec allows fiscal deficit but no more than the 
accumulated fiscal surplus in previous years. Other provinces such as Alberta, Ontario and New Brunswick also require 
additional fiscal targets relating to debt ratio, net assets, or contingency allowance. 
In Argentina the FRL (2004) said that budgets for primary spending (current and capital, net of interest cost) may not 
grow faster than the rate of growth of the national GDP, as foreseen in the national macroeconomic framework (also 
called for in the FRL). If GDP growth is negative, then the primary spending may not grow, but does not have to shrink. 
The limitation on primary spending is weakened by important exceptions: namely, any investment spending for basic 
social infrastructure, spending financed by international organizations, and spending paid with unused revenue from 
previous years. Borrowing does have an aggregate limit in that debt service (projected) may not exceed 15 percent of 
revenue (net of participation transfers earmarked for the municipalities). Nonetheless, the outcomes have been mixed 
and often less favorable than in the possibly optimistic projections, putting some provinces over the 15 percent limit. 
Furthermore, as a result of the recession that accompanied the global downturn in 2009, Congress derogated key fiscal 
targets for 2010 and 2011; and in particular those setting ceilings on current primary spending growth, the overall 
primary fiscal balance, and new borrowing (Law 26.530). Such a temporary suspension reflects first the need to 
consider escape clauses in FRLs that would provide more flexibility to public spending when facing adverse external or 
domestic shocks; and second, the need to save in the counter-cyclical fund when the provincial economies are in 
expansion, which did not happen. This legal initiative was also accompanied by another Programa Federal de 
Desendeudamiento (Decree No.60/2010) that allows restructuring of eligible provincial debts, affected by the 
deterioration of their fiscal balances. Up to the end of August 2010, about eighteen provinces had benefitted from such 
programs.  
4.3 Enforcement and escape clause 
Rules are only as good as their enforcement, and FRLs vary in terms of the strength of enforcement called for in the law 
and in terms of how well the governments implement the law in practice. On the enforcement and escape clauses, there is 
great variability across countries, and within country in the case of Canada.  
The enforcement ranges from no specific enforcement clause in the case of states FRLs in Australia and most provinces in 
Canada to strict enforcement in the case of Brazil, Colombia, Peru and three provinces in Canada. Indian states broadly 
follows the sanction clause in the national FRL that whenever there is a breaching of intra-year targets of revenues and 
expenditures, the state government should take appropriate measures for increasing revenues and/or reducing 
expenditures, including curtailment of the sums authorized to be paid and applied from out of the Consolidated Fund of 
the state. However there is no specific timeframe for meeting the targets.  
 More strict sanctions on the SNGs can be found in Brazil, Colombia, Peru and three provinces in Canada. In Brazil, the 
FRL reiterates from earlier laws the requirement that if an SNG’s debt is over the legal limit it may not borrow (except for 
refinancing) and would no longer receive ―voluntary‖ transfers from the federal government (transfers not from 
tax-sharing participations). Debt and labor contracts in violation of the FRL are not legally valid, which would be a 
negative ex post consequence for any lender who thus would lose its money. The Fiscal Crimes Law (LCF), a companion 
law to the FRL specifies criminal penalties—fines and even jail—for officials who violate the rules. The LCF applies to 
public officials of all branches of government at all levels. Among other provisions, the LCF provides for detention of up 
to four years for a public official who engages in credit operations without prior legislative authorization, incurs 
unauthorized expenditure commitments (including any in the last two quarters in office that cannot be repaid during the 
present term of office), extends loan guarantees without collateral of equal or higher value, increases personnel 
expenditures during the final 180 days of the term of office, or issues unregistered public debt (IMF 2001).  
The Colombia a unified FRL imposes strict sanctions on SNGs for their non-compliance with FRL. When SNGs do not 
comply with the limits imposed by the FRL, they will be prohibited from borrowing. They also have to adopt a 
fiscal-rescue program to regain viability within the next two years. The governments must make across the board 
spending cuts whenever actual non-earmarked current revenues are come in lower than in the budget estimates. Sanctions 
are also imposed on lenders. The law tightens the regulations on the supply side. It prohibits lending by the national 
government to a subnational entity or guaranteeing its debt if the subnational is in violation of Law 617 or Law 358 or if it 
has debt service arrears to the national government. Furthermore, lending to subnationals by financial institutions and 
territorial development institutions must meet the conditions and limits of various regulations such as law 358, law 617, 
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and law 817. Otherwise the credit contract is invalid and borrowed funds must be restituted promptly without interest or 
any other charges (FRL Art. 21).  
In Peru, violation of the FRL targets or some other legal targets by SNGs will cause the temporary disruption of transfers 
from participatory funds, such as FONCOR, FONCOMUN, and FIDE, which are block grants to regional and communal 
governments and are set by a formula that favors localities with a higher share of low-income population.  
The two Canadian provinces that have sanctions are British Colombia and Manitoba. In British Columbia, the members 
of the executive council are subject to a 20 percent pay cut when fiscal targets are not met. The cut can be partially or fully 
restored when fiscal targets are met. In Manitoba, if fiscal balance at the end of year is negative, ministerial salaries are cut 
by 20 percent in the first year and 40 percent in the second year if the deficit continues. Ontario has similar sanctions of 
cutting the salary of Executive Council members when deficit target is missed.  
In Argentina, the FRL (2004) does not have strong sanctions on the SNGs or their lenders. Furthermore, it allows the 
Federal Council of Fiscal Responsibility discretion to decide which of the possible sanctions to apply (Art. 32). If an 
SNG’s debt service exceeds the limit, then it may not borrow except to rollover existing debt on more favorable terms and 
as part of a fiscal adjustment program, perhaps with a multilateral international lender. Provincial governments that miss 
the fiscal targets in their macro frameworks have faced little political fallout; it has been easy to shift blame to the overall 
macro situation and to unfunded mandates from the national government. As has been the case all along in Argentina, 
creditors can make a prior claim on the participation transfers to get the debt service due, which leaves them with little 
concern as to whether or not their provincial client is within the bounds of the FRL.  
With regard to escape clauses, none of the Australian states contain it. Brazil and Peru FRLs and FRLs by Indian states 
have escape clause to relax fiscal targets and debt ceilings in the event of calamity and less than 1 percent economic 
growth for the last four quarters (Brazil), negative growth and national emergency (Peru, Article 5), national security or 
natural calamity or exceptional grounds (Indian states). Escape clause differs across Canadian provinces, with some 
provinces do not have one, while some provinces has escape clause in the event of major disaster or extraordinary 
circumstances. Colombia’s FRL does not have an explicit escape clause. Nor does Argentina’s FRL, although the 
congress did suspend key provisions of the FRL during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis.  
Rules also need to take into account exogenous shocks—like a global recession—and allow some accommodation, 
without undermining the fiscal discipline. The ongoing global economic crisis has pressured sovereign and sub-sovereign 
finance, which has led some countries to apply the escape clause. The extent of the full response will need to be reviewed.  
A key question during a macroeconomic crisis, such as the 2008-2009 global crisis, is whether it is more appropriate for 
the central government to do all of the fiscal stimulus or loosen the fiscal constraints for subnational governments. For 
example, the Thirteenth Finance Commission in India recommended that the central government be the one bearing the 
cost of the crisis and the states should receive assistance from the center for providing the stimulus.   
5. FRLs in Broader Institutional Context for Fiscal Prudence 
FRLs do not operate alone, nor are FRLs sufficient to enforce fiscal discipline. To understand the role of FRLs in 
enforcing fiscal discipline, it helps to know the range of institutional tools available for this purpose and to know what 
other institutions for fiscal discipline exist, including the overall incentive structure and enforcement capabilities for 
subnational and national governments and their creditors. 
5.1 Lender-borrower nexus and timing of controls and sanctions 
Deficits and debt arise from the joint decision of governments and their creditors (including suppliers allowing extended 
payments). These decisions are made in light of not only the rules governing issuance of the debt, but also the ex ante 
expectations about what will happen to the debtor and the creditors if payment difficulties arise—who will lose money 
or who will be forced into painful adjustment. The decisions of that lending moment become a fait accompli 
conditioning the subsequent decisions. This points to two important dimensions of control of government borrowing. 
First the type or timing—ex ante controls or ex post consequences; and second whether the ex ante controls and ex post 
consequences act on borrowers or lenders. Together these make a matrix with four cells, as in Table 3 below.  
Traditionally the fiscal discipline literature has focused on the first column—constraints and incentives of borrowers. Ex 
ante constraints on subnational borrowers include debt and deficit ceilings, restrictions on international borrowing, and 
regulation of SNGs’ borrowing based on fiscal-capacity criteria. Typically an FRL includes these, but also includes 
more such as the public finance process and procedural rules that may lead to debt.  
To complement the ex-ante constraints and to make them credible, there need to be ex post consequences for failures in 
fiscal prudence. Practices to impose ex post consequences on SNGs include limits or prohibitions on central bank 
financing, no bailouts (from central government or from international community) or debt workouts without adequate 
conditionality, requirements to publish detailed fiscal results, refusal by the central government to accept SNG debt, and 
withholding debt service from transfers to SNGs.  
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Table 2. Lender-Borrower Nexus and Timing of Controls and Sanctions: Channels for Control of Deficits and Debt 
 For Borrowers  
(typically part of FRL) 
For Lenders 
Ex Ante Controls All governments 
-Debt and deficit ceilings 
-Restrictions on international borrowing 
-Publication of detailed fiscal results 
SNGs only 
-Regulation of SNGs’ borrowing, based on 
fiscal-capacity criteria (regulations by central 
government or SNG itself, central bank, or 
other institution) 
All governments 
- No direct central bank financing 
- Regulations by central bank or 
other financial supervision agency 
SNGs only 
- Cap on total borrowing by SNGs 
- Increased capital requirements for 
lending to risky SNGs 
Ex Post 
Consequences  
All governments 
-Limits on central bank financing 
-No bailouts (from central government or from 
international community) and no debt workout 
without adequate conditionality 
-Publication of detailed fiscal results 
SNGs only 
-Central government does not accept SNG debt 
-Debt service withheld from transfers to SNGs 
Insolvency system 
All governments 
- Strong supervision of banks  
SNGs only 
- Regulations require capital 
write-offs for losses from SNG 
debt  
- No central bank bailouts 
- Well-functioning financial 
market can increase risk 
premium for uncreditworthy 
borrowers 
Some countries have also a formal insolvency system for SNGs (Canuto and Liu, 2010, Liu and Waibel 2009). The 
experience of Brazil in the 1990s shows that ex ante constraints, which abounded, were not sufficient by themselves. 
Borrowers and lenders colluded extravagantly to evade the rules as long as ex post bailouts were forthcoming. The 1997 
debt restructuring agreement between the federal government and 25 states had the federal government took over the 
states’ debt but requiring states carry out far-reaching fiscal reforms and in compliance with the fiscal targets. In 
Argentina in the 1990s, on the other hand, there were few ex ante constraints, and the experience with pulling provinces 
into line in the fiscal crisis of the mid-1990s by use of ex post consequences—mainly withholding debt service from 
transfers-seemed to validate the government’s choice to focus on ex post rather than ex ante measure. By the end of the 
1990s, however, many provinces built up such debts and off-budget obligations that in the 2000s the government started 
opting for conditional bailouts, rather than pay the political cost of imposing hard consequences (Dillinger and Webb 
1999, Rodden 2003, Webb 2003). 
Without lenders there is no borrowing or debt, so their constraints and incentives deserve equal attention. Lenders are 
not always automatically prudent enough, as many episodes reveal, including the financial crisis of 2008. Banking 
regulations can restrain lenders behavior, but lenders would view the SNG borrowers as riskless if the central 
government or central bank ultimately guarantees the debt, and passing the risk to others—taxpayers or nominal asset 
holders (subject to the inflation tax). In the case of Brazil, in addition to the FRL, decisive factors include the debt 
renegotiation contracts and the constraints to the credit supply by banks and especially by public banks to SNGs.  
Regulations as listed in the top right box attempt to constrain such moral hazards ex ante: no direct central bank 
financing, restrictions on international borrowing, increased capital requirements for lending to risky SNGs, and 
borrowing cap for lending to SNGs. Rules and practices can also punish risky lender behavior ex post, such as by 
having strong supervision of banks, raising capital ratios for loan from entities with poor capital ratings, requiring 
capital write-offs for losses from SNG debt, and providing no bailouts from the national treasury or central bank. 
Relying on constraints only on borrowers means that lenders still have incentives to push loans and may find reckless or 
desperate politicians willing to borrow despite the rules. This happened in the 1990s in Colombia, when laws aimed to 
constrain subnational borrowing, but financial sector regulation loosened for some years, and then some departments 
got excessive lending. In the 2000s, the government addressed the problem by tightening both the financial sector 
regulation and the legal controls on the SNGs, with the 2003 FRL and other measures. 
Ex ante regulation can also work on the borrower side. To improve fiscal transparency, Mexico introduced a credit 
rating system for SNGs. Although subnational participation in the credit rating is voluntary, the requirements of the 
capital-risk weighting of bank loans introduced in 2000 and of loss provisions introduced in 2004 aim at imposing 
subnational fiscal discipline through the market pricing of subnational credit. In Colombia, the Fiscal Transparency and 
Responsibility Law (2003) also tightened the regulations on the supply side. Lending to SNGs by financial institutions 
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and territorial development institutions must meet the conditions and limits of various regulations, such as Law 617 and 
Law 817. Otherwise, the credit contract is invalid and borrowed funds must be restituted promptly without interest or 
any other charges. 
Ideally, any lending should be subject to at least some constraints in all four quadrants. Relying only on ex ante 
constraints, without ex post consequences, gives irresponsible borrowers and lenders a big incentive to get around the 
ex-ante rules and do transactions that will latter get bailed out, as happened in Brazil prior to the late 1990s. Relying 
only on ex post consequences allows irresponsible (and large) entities to build up such large debts that the national 
government will not have the political will to enforce the consequences, as it happened in Argentina in the late 1990s. 
Ex ante constraints are important in economies where the government’s own major banks and financial institutions or 
where financial markets do not respond appropriately to indicators of risk. Under such conditions, credit-allocation 
decisions are driven more by considerations of political expediency than of fiscal prudence. 
The ex-ante and ex post controls do not aim to minimize the debt financing, but rather to promote sustainable debt 
financing through a competitive and diversified subnational credit system. Debt financing is important and helpful for 
infrastructure development, where the assets created last longer than the terms of current taxation and transfers.  
5.2 Broader public finance legislation 
FRLs are not the only legal framework that impose fiscal discipline on SNGs. Some countries have adopted broader 
public finance laws such as a balanced budget law with effects similar to FRLs. In the federal system of the United 
States, each state in sets limits for itself and for its local governments. Legal frameworks, laws, and regulations vary by 
state. Some of the common elements include: debt financing must be for a public (not private) purpose; debt limits are 
specified in laws/state constitutions to avoid excessive borrowing; debt limits may not apply to bonds payable from a 
―special fund,‖ but the issuance of such bonds follow a separate set of regulations; governmental accounting standards 
(GAAP) are established by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (www.gasb.org) with each state determining 
what accounting standards they and their local governments will use; and all meetings of a majority of the members of a 
governing body of an issuer must be open to the public (Haines 2009). In the United States, markets play a vital role in 
fiscal surveillance.  
In Poland the Public Finance Law (2005) limits SNG debt to no more than 60 percent its total revenues; SNG debt 
service as percent of its total revenue no more than 15 percent; if SNG debt as percent of revenue reaches 55 percent, 
then the debt service as percent of revenues cannot be more than 12 percent; and debt service needs to include guarantee 
payments for a given budget year even if the guarantees are not recalled. 
The South African Municipal Finance Management Act, enacted in 2003, contains a new framework for municipal 
finance and borrowing. Chapter 13 of the Act spells out detailed criteria for interventions and recovery plans, specifies the 
role of national and provincial governments and courts in the insolvency mechanism, and outlines the fiscal and debt 
adjustment process. The act defines one set of fiscal indicators for ―serious financial problems,‖ and another for 
―persistent material breach of financial commitments.‖ If the first set of triggers is met, the provincial government may 
intervene. Under the second set of triggers, provincial intervention is mandatory. Unsuccessful provincial intervention 
calls for national government intervention. Interwoven with these interventions, the municipal government can apply to 
the High Court to stay all legal proceedings against the municipal government, and to relieve, suspend or discharge 
financial obligations. Only courts can stay debt payments and discharge debt obligations. 
From the experience of Australia, Brazil, Canada, and India, FRLs become an important institution as the previous 
existing public finance or other legislation had not been able to contain the fiscal risks including those of SNGs. FRLs 
become a vehicle of political debates in these countries where the broader macroeconomic environment and fiscal crises 
had made FRLs a more focused instrument for fiscal reforms. Colombia developed various laws to deal with SNG fiscal 
problems, and later the FRL of 2003 became a unifying that included key elements of the previous laws and also new 
elements. In Peru, the beginning of the decentralization in the early 2000s incorporated the lessons in Argentina and 
Brazil, and the FRL was enacted with a key objective of preventing fiscal risks of decentralization. Argentina tried to 
follow the South American trend in passing FRLs, but it has not developed the same national consensus in favor of fiscal 
sustainability; consequently its FRLs have not succeeded in instilling fiscal discipline. 
5.3 Effects from an FRL 
Since countries passed FRLs (some in the mid- to late 1990s and some in the 2000s), some evidence has accumulated 
on their effectiveness. Although political consensus for fiscal prudence is clearly a necessary condition to launch a 
successful FRL, the test of its effective implementation comes when another party comes to power or when the 
consensus otherwise breaks down, and then one sees whether the institution works to help the remaining stabilization 
champions restrain the fiscal excesses that fiscally irresponsible politicians might want. Because fiscal outcomes depend 
on many factors besides the FRL—GDP growth, terms of trade, international interest rates, etc.—the evidence allows us 
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at most to see whether there is an association of FRLs and fiscal outcomes.  
Despite the complexities, to the extent that an FRL helps improve government finance and avoid over-indebtedness, one 
would expect to see improved fiscal outcomes on average in the periods after passage of an FRL. We therefore 
compared the growth of public debt in the five years before and five years after the passing of FRLs by subnational 
governments in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, and India. (Liu and Webb 2011 show the detailed data. Where 
individual states had FRLs—Australia, Canada and India—we examined the states’ data separately for each law.) To 
leave out the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which increased deficits everywhere, the analysis 
covered up to end 2007. In all countries examined, the post-FRL periods saw positive turnarounds in subnational fiscal 
performance (Brazil, Colombia, and India), or continuing improvement in fiscal consolidation (Australia and Canada). 
In Australia, the SNG debt/GSDP was already declining in all five states in the sample in the pre-FRL five-year period, 
and this continued in the post-FRL period. The decline of debt/GSDP continued at a faster pace in two states after the 
law, and continued at a slower pace in the other three states. So attribution to the FRLs is not clear. 
In Brazil, although the growth of debt/GDP for SNGs was positive for both the pre and post-FRL periods, the debt 
growth slowed down from 5.0 percent to 1.3 percent per year. This suggests a favorable effect of the FRL. The growth 
of federal debt also slowed.   
In Canada, the six provinces that passed FRLs all had declining debt as shares of GSDP in the five years afterward. In 
British Colombia and Nova Scotia, this decline reversed the trend of rising debt as share of GSDP in the pre-FRL period; 
both had double-digit improvements in the rate of change of debt/GSDP. The other three provinces already had 
declining debt share of GSDP for the FRL. The debt/GSDP of Newfoundland and Labrador continued to decline in the 
post-FRL period at a faster speed, and Alberta, Ontario and New Brunswick continued their debt reduction but at a 
slower pace. The FRLs may have had a beneficial effect, but evidence was unclear. 
In Colombia, the debt/GSDP ratio for SNGs rose from 2 percent in 1996 (the year before the traffic light Law 358) to 
3.5 percent in 2001. After the FRL in 2003, the ratio declined to 1.5 percent by 2006. The FRL apparently contributed to 
the greater fiscal prudence.  
In Indian states, the growth of debt /GSDP was slower in the post-FRL period than the pre-FRL period for 24 out of 26 
states. Twenty-one of these 24 states had reversed the trend of increasing debt/GSDP in the pre-FRL period, which 
suggests a beneficial effect of the FRLs. 
5.4 Shifting political situations shaped and tested the effectiveness of FRLs.  
In Brazil, the FRL was passed in 2000 by a right-center national government with a strong commitment to fiscal stability 
and with a desire for a similar commitment in SNGs. A consensus-building process of discussions with the states helped 
create consensus in favor of fiscal responsibility. A key test came and was passed when a Labor government subsequently 
took power in 2002 and maintained that commitment, both for the national government and for enforcing the FRL for 
SNGs. In 2009 Brazil achieved an investment-grade credit rating. The fiscal reform and consolidation in Brazilian states 
are embedded in both the annual Programs of Fiscal Adjustment (PAF) between the federal government and the states 
since 1998 and the FRL since 2000. In 2001, the debt of most major municipalities was restructured in an identical fashion 
to the 1997 state debt restructuring. The debt restructurings of 1997 and 2001 were successful in improving the fiscal 
balances of states and municipalities. Within 18 months the states’ negative primary balances turned positive, averaging 
one percent of GDP in recent years, thereby contributing to the improved macroeconomic conditions in Brazil. One state, 
Minas Gerais, challenged the FRL rules in 1999, provoking a crisis, but the national government carried out the prescribed 
sanctions, and the state got back into line. Implementation of the PAFs and FRL played a vital role in maintaining 
macroeconomic stability and avoiding a systemic financial crisis in Brazil (World Bank, 2008).  
In India, introducing FRLs at the state and central government levels was associated with fiscal adjustment since the 
early 2000s.
13
 Following their fiscal crises, the states of Karnataka and Punjab each enacted its own fiscal responsibility 
law in 2002, first in the country. The 13th Finance Commission played a key role in building consensus on the fiscal 
policy agenda. The implementation of FRL at the center widened the practice of rule-based public finances and 
enactment of FRLs by more states. These reforms, together with higher economic growth, introduction of VAT, and 
increase in the states’ share in net central taxes, contributed to the improvement in the finance of the center and states 
from 2004/05 to 2007/08 (India Thirteenth Finance Commission, 2009). In the wake of the 2008/09 global crisis, the 
central government allowed the states to have additional market borrowing, increasing the limit of gross fiscal deficit to 
exceed the regular FRL targets without abandoning the principle of rules.  
In Colombia, three periods are relevant: the period before the traffic-light law of 1997, the period with the traffic-light 
law but not the FRL, and the period after the passage of the FRL in 2003. The traffic-light law was passed in a moment 
                                                        
13
Howes and Jha (2004) argued for FRLs with this rationale.  
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of enthusiasm for better fiscal policy at local levels, but the enthusiasm did not last and subnational debt problems 
recurred, along with national level fiscal problems. The FRL in 2003 reflected a reinvigorated commitment to fiscal 
responsibility and institutionalized it. The president elected in 2010 was from the same party, and that administration 
continued the fiscal policy commitments of its predecessor.  
In Peru a centrist government passed the FRL in 2003 in order to make sure that its new fiscal decentralization program 
did not lead to macro fiscal problems. The next government in 2006, headed by the president and left-leaning party that 
had led the country into hyperinflation in the late 1980s, continued the same responsible fiscal policy that the FRL had 
started to institutionalize during the previous administration. Peru’s sovereign foreign currency rating was upgraded to 
investment grade first by Fitch and Standard and Poor’s in 2008 and then by Moody’s in 2009, reflecting the strong 
growth performance, prudent fiscal and liability management, and the resulting improvement in solvency indicators. 
Subnational fiscal restraint has continued into the 2010s, although factors other than the FRL seem more at work and 
reforms in 2015 updated the mechanisms for fiscal reporting by SNGs. 
In Argentina the 1999 FRL (and the provincial FRLs) stopped working in 2001 because of the extreme mismatch 
between the national government’s fiscal and monetary policies in the context of a fixed exchange rate. Although the 
federal government’s FRL lacked enforcement power, a bigger problem was the government’s many legally inflexible 
spending obligations, most notably debt service and provincial transfers. The provincial FRLs also had shortcomings 
that would have been problematic even if the collapse at the top had not come first. They lacked enforcement power and 
a critical mass of states had not passed them. The 2004 FRL, while more comprehensive than its predecessor, again did 
not reflect a national consensus that fiscal prudence was worth political sacrifice. Compliance was incomplete from the 
start, sanctions were weak, and the binding features of the law were suspended when an economic slowdown came in 
2008-2009. Fiscal mismanagement at the national level and in many provinces continued through the end of 2015, at 
which time a new government was elected.  
In Canada, macroeconomic deterioration in the 1980s to early 1990s led to major changes in monetary and fiscal policy. 
After suffering from a lack of credibility, the Bank of Canada since the early 1990s committed to low and stable 
inflation. The attainment of inflation targeting overtime improved market and public confidence (Perrier and Armano 
2000; Paulin 2000; OECD 2001). On the fiscal front, in the early 1990s, the importance of restoring sound public 
finances became increasingly clear at both the federal and provincial level. The fiscal framework adopted by the federal 
government and legislation by provinces helped the move toward more sustainable public finances (Traclet 2004).  
In Australia, some states went ahead with fiscal reforms and enacted legislation committing to balanced budget or debt 
targets, prior to the federal enactment of Charter of Budget Honesty in 1998.  
In summary, although the FRLs have not always been the main legal basis for long-term fiscal management, they have 
been a part of the overall institutional framework for long-term fiscal prudence in the cases where there was political 
commitment to that.   
Macroeconomic developments and nationwide reforms can provide an overall impetus. Consistency with other parts of 
the macro-fiscal system, subnational fiscal reform often unfolds in the broader macroeconomic context. A common trait 
of successful FRLs for subnational governments is the commitment of the central government to its own fiscal prudence, 
which is usually reinforced by the application of the FRL to the national as well as subnational level.  
Establishing an FRL or other institution to constrain SNG debt and deficits works only if the governments in question 
start from or are brought to a position where they do not have extreme debt overhang. In other words, if the service on 
existing debt is already too large to pay realistically in the political economic situation, this attenuates greatly the 
incentive from an FRL to behave with fiscal responsibility. Consequently, a set of SNG fiscal adjustment and debt 
rescheduling programs often must complement or precede the implementation of an FRL. To work, the programs must 
strike a balance between being sufficient to eliminate the debt overhang and being so generous as to seem to reward 
fiscal irresponsibility of the past (or to fiscally hamstring the national government). Brazil, Colombia, and India 
undertook SNG debt restructuring, separate from or preceding the FRL and important for its success.  
The dynamics of subnational-central government interaction provides political momentum and stimulates discussion of 
fiscal reforms. Given the growing share of subnational finance in the consolidated public finance and the growing 
influence of political forces at the subnational level, often a subnational government can lead the fiscal reform, which has 
demonstration effect for national reform. In other cases, the national government passed the FRL for itself and encourage 
SNGs to pass their own FRLs.  
Since fiscal responsibility with multiple players (national and subnational governments) is a coordination problem with 
multiple possible equilibria (Braun and Tommasi 2004), it depends on having a critical mass of states that voluntarily 
obey the rules and politically support the national government when it applies sanctions to enforce the rules. For 
instance, the fiscal sanction of Minas Gerais in 2000 helped assure that no other states would challenge the law and thus 
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was a critical step in the success of Brazil’s FRL.  
6. Conclusions 
Although our evidence does not prove that FRLs are necessary or even sufficient for achieving fiscal prudence at 
multiple levels of government, the examples reviewed in this paper show that FRLs can help coordinate and sustain 
commitments to fiscal prudence. They are not a substitute for commitment and should not be viewed as ends in 
themselves. FRLs can make a positive contribution by adding to the collection of other measures to shore up a coalition 
of states with the central government in support of fiscal prudence. Although political consensus for fiscal prudence is 
clearly a necessary condition to launch a successful FRL, the test of its effective implementation has comes when the 
consensus weakens. Often the institution has helped the remaining stabilization champions restrain the fiscal excesses 
that the populists might want.  
In designing an FRL, defining fiscal targets poses a special challenge. Many factors that influence the fiscal accounts of 
the SNGs are exogenous to the SNGs, such as interest and exchange rates. The national governments also mandate 
expenditure items and the intergovernmental fiscal frameworks may limit the taxation power of SNGs. Focusing on 
ratios where the SNGs have control over the denominator as well as the numerator (e.g., wage bill as a share of total 
spending) is more likely to have the desired effect than relying on ratios that are substantially influenced by exogenous 
factors.  
A set of SNG fiscal adjustment and debt rescheduling programs often must complement or precede the implementation 
of an FRL. It is not realistic to expect SNGs with large debt overhang to comply with sustainable fiscal targets. On the 
other hand, in order for FRLs to provide credible incentives for fiscal prudence, the terms of restructuring cannot signal 
potential future bailouts. Therefore, there needs to be a balance between avoiding moral hazard and proving sufficient 
financial relief to ensure that the SNGs can realistically comply with FRLs.  
Even when FRLs are effective, they cannot do the job alone. The potential contribution depends on how well it 
complements the rest of the institutional framework for SNG fiscal restraint—making labor and pension laws more 
flexible, giving subnational governments more taxing power, using rules for debt renegotiations to reduce the salary bill 
as a share of revenue, using financial sector regulation to restrain lending to SNGs, and commitment to hard budget 
constraints on SNGs. The experience shows the need to have both ex ante constraints on borrowing and ex post 
sanctions for over borrowing. Even beyond the network of specific fiscal rules, the deeper institutions and expectations 
need to motivate respect and enforcement of the rules (Braun and Tommasi 2004). 
SNG borrowing for financing social and economic infrastructure can generate positive net social returns. FRL 
framework is not meant to eliminate credit market access by SNGs. The challenge is to design fiscal rules and 
framework that will achieve the dual objectives of expanding market access by SNG for financing economic growth and 
containing the risks of excessive borrowing.   
Questions for future research include: How to set subnational along with national fiscal targets, either in FRLs or other 
public finance laws? How these targets relate to the threshold for fiscal and debt sustainability? How to construct escape 
clauses that will not become convenient evasion clauses in case of severe global or regional downturns? What kind of 
enforcement mechanism would ensure fiscal discipline, particularly in the absence of effective market systems? Over 
the longer periods of business and political cycles, can the effect of fiscal legislation be more accurately measured? 
How can institutions for fiscal discipline—FRLs, etc.—avoid making fiscal policy excessively pro-cyclical?  
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